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Despite the United Nations General Assembly's resolution declaring the 
period 1976-1987 the "Transport and Communications Decade in Africa" the 
performances of African telecommunications networks remain among the 
poorest, if not the poorest, in the world. 
The 1980 Yearbook of Common Carrier Telecommunications Statistics 
published by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) indicated 
that, as of January 1979, on a world total of 279,528,000 telephone main 
lines (ML) Africa had only 0.9 percent (2,515,725) of this total, the North 
American continent having 391 percent (109,297,000). Africa has also the 
lowest telephone density (0.66 per 100 inhabitants in North America, and 
14.6 ML in Europe. But general statistics vary from one source to another. 
The ITU suggests 0.4 telephones per 100 inhabitants in Africa, (1) thus, 
contradicting data (0.6 per 100 inhabitants) published by the above 
mentioned yearbook. Further, key determinants like -rural areas" and 
"urban areas" are not defined at all, which does not help policy-makers to 
have a fair judgment on the magnitude of the imbalances between cities and 
villages regarding the rate of telephone fluctuation in Africa. 
Statistics are even more negative for about one quarter of African 
countries which have a telephone density equal to or below 01 percent per 
100 persons (2). The ITU study on Appropriate Modern Telecommunications 
Technology for Integrated Rural Development in Africa suggested the 
following statistics for 8 Black African countries: the number of direct 
exchange lines (DEL) per 100 inhabitants was as low as 0.06 in Chad, Mali, and 
Rwanda. The number of DEL in Nigeria and Burkina Faso stagnated (0.07) 
while in Zaire, Niger and the Central African Republic (010), Guinea-Bissau 
(0.13) and Benin (017) statistics were very alarming. According to the same 
source a comparative exercise on telephone penetration in the urban and 
rural areas of 26 sub-Saharan African countries indicated that on a total 
population of around 266 million people including an overwhelming majority 
of rural population (more than 219 million people) there was a global number 
of around 1 million telephone sets. On this grand total, rural areas have 
only approximately 139,000 telephone sets which corresponded to a level 
inferior to 14 percent. But in several countries this average ratio was 
much lower: 1 percent in Ivory Coast, 2.5 percent in Senegal, 3 percent in 
Upper Volta, 6 percent in Congo and Ethiopia, 7 percent in Zi$mbia and 8 
percent in Tanzania. Measured in terms of telephone density per 100 rural 
population for the 1978-1980 period the statistics were much more 
unfavorable: Zambia 0.006, Angola 0.08, Burundi 0.04, Cameroon 0.07, 
Ethiopia 0.02, Ivory Coast 014, Mali 0.017, Nigeria 0.02, Senegal 0.03, Sudan 
and Tanzania 0.04. However, it should be noted that an important factor is 
ignored by these statistics. They do not take into account the 
concentration of telephone networks in and around the major cities in rural 
areas (3). 
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From 1969 to 1979, the African stock of equipments grew only by 1,082,500 
ML (0.8 percent) and 2,024,800 stations of all kinds (SAK) (1 percent). During 
the same period the stock of equipment in North America grew by 20.5 
percent (27,109,000 ML). In 1977, an ITU survey indicated that more than 
half of fifty African countries had less than 20,000 telephones and that 
only eight among those countries had a total number of telephones 
exceeding 100,000 (with the exception of Namibia and South Africa). As a 
result, penetration of telephones in twelve Black African countries is 
lower or equal to 0.1.`x. Key countries --in terms of their economic 
potential, national resources, and demographic weight-- like Zaire, Nigeria, 
and Mozambique, belong to this group (4). 
The recently published UNESCO Report on World Communication definitely 
places African statistics as the lowest in the world (5). 
1. In Search for an Intearated TelecoMmunications Network on a Pan- 
African Scale 
It was in an uncertain context that twenty-six African states represented 
by 115 delegates and six overseas observers met in Dakar, Senegal, in 1962 
under the auspices of the International Telecommunications Union. An 
African Plan Subcommittee created two years earlier by the Plenary 
Assembly of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT) and the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) 
outlined, with the participation of the African Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations, the first international plan for the 
development of an African telecommunications network (6}. 
The plan established in Dakar was an ambitious one. It included the 
establishment of direct links between the African countries without 
passing through centres outside Africa, and the gradual replacement of 
numerous high frequency radio links by overhead wire carrier links, 
underground or submarine cables and radio-relay links. 
The delegates also reviewed the technical, operational and tariff problems 
of interest to the countries in the region and adopted resolutions on the 
technical assistance desired by African countries. 
In 1967, a second meeting of the African Sub-Committee, subsequently called 
African Plan Committee, was organized in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In June 1968, 
two consultant teams began a preliminary study covering 38 African 
countries representing 87 percent of the population and 85 percent of the 
area. Completed in October 1969, the study forecast traffic growth through 
1990, selected reliable trunk routes (7), and reviewed the state of 
numbering and transmission plans, the signalling systems in use or planned 
(8), routing plans and existing tariff structures. 
1969 was a pivotal year for Africa in her effort to initiate progress in 
telecommunications planning. Indeed, major credits totalling 2,057,500 U.S. 
dollars were granted by the UNDP at the request of the ITU and 30 African 
countries for detailed technical, economic and financial studies of the 
transmission arteries (20,000 kilometers) and 18 international switching 
centers to be installed. The pre-investment study following the ITU pre- 
feasibility study completed in October 1969, included all possible 
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transmission media (metallic line arteries, coaxial cables, submarine 
cables, radio relay systems and a regional satellite system). The agenda 
also included the selection of a single common regional signalling system, 
the adoption of tariffs and methods for forecasting benefits on a regional 
level, and the establishment of very close working relationships between 
African administrations in national and international telecommunications 
matters. UNDP agreed that the ITU should hire experts supervised by a 
Project Manager and benefitting from the technical and administrative 
services of the International Consultative Committee and the Group of 
Engineers set up by the Plenipotentiary Conference (Montreux, Switzerland, 
1965) within the UNDFs Technical Cooperation Department (9). 
The survey carried out by Norconsult of Oslo (Norway), Preece, Cordew and 
Rider Brighton (United Kingdom), Acres Intertel of Toronto (Canada), 
Sofrecom of Paris (France), and Swedtel of Stockholm(Sweden), concluded 
that a Pan African telecommunications network (Panaftel) combining coaxial 
cables and radio-relay links is the best system to meet African 
telecommunications needs. It was agreed that Panaftel should not only 
ensure interconnection between African countries but also serve important 
national centers. 
Conscious of the importance of these conclusions for the implementation 
of the Panaftel project, the OAU approved them and adopted a resolution 
stressing the pressing need to accelerate the creation of an integrated 
Pan African telecommunication network. A Coordinating Committee was 
immediately set up to organize more effectively than in the past the 
investments coming from external sources and desperately needed by the 
African states. The Committee was headed by the Administrative 
Secretary-General of the OAU, the Executive Secretary of the ECA, the 
President of the African Development Bank (ADB), and the Secretary-General 
of the ITU. The ITU handled the coordination of the technical aspects of 
the Panaftel project while ADB was responsible for the financial aspects. 
During these difficult years, and in the absence of a strong Pan-African 
telecommunications authority, the ITU assumed responsibilities which 
undoubtedly had an impact beyond the level initially desired by the newly 
created African states. Furthermore, as the African governments 
controlled the postal and telecommunications facilities under severe 
budgetary and administrative constraints, the scope of their action was 
limited not only nationally but on a panafrican and an international level 
as well. The postal and telecommunications administrations shared a 
common organization generally }mown as Postal, Telephone and Telegraph 
office (PTT). ' An ITU study pointed out that "as a result, a host of 
undesirable features brought about by common organization has stifled the 
development and growth of 300 telecommunications industry as compared to 
other public utilities such as transport, water or electricity which are 
self-contained and operated as an independent organization". The report 
also underlined the fact that "a large scale management planning and 
development of telecommunication administration and organization" was 
urgently needed in order to increase performances at the operational 
level. 
Colloquium on Restructuration of Telecoications -5 
Sector - Tunisia, 17-21 May, 1992 
In the early 1970s, another specialized agency of the United Nations, the 
United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was 
also involved in the efforts aiming at increasing telecommunications growth 
in the African continent. In October 1973, an African Regional Seminar on 
Satellite Broadcasting Systems for Education and Development was held in 
Addis Ababa, under the auspices of the UNESCO. Participants at the seminar 
suggested that further studies be undertaken in view of establishing an 
integrated satellite systemwhichcouldbe used for education, information, 
training and public telecommunications. 
The Anglo-French satellite Symphonie was launched and used for 
demonstrations in several African nations, in particular, in Cameroon and 
Ivory Coast. While Cameroonwithdrew very early from the project the Ivory 
Coast was chosen as the main target country in an attempt to "sell" the 
performances and reliability of a European satellite system financially 
backed by the European Economic Community. This European initiative was 
perceived by the Americans as a hostile move against their own interests 
and, in any case, as a threat to the U.S. dominated International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat). The same year, the 
U.S. Agency f or International Development, in conjunction with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), spent 3 million US dollars to 
promote the ATS-6 satellite system in several African countries. 
In the ASSOP-6 project, manufacturers from 13 European countries who 
manage Eurospace planned to replace the Symphonie satellite by a more 
powerful OTS satellite operating in the 11/14 GHz band and capable of 
retransmitting from two to twelve television programs. Eurospace claimed 
that the project was specially designed for developing countries, and 
Africa, in particular, despite evidence to the contrary. Indeed, the project 
would require a sophisticated terrestrial network equipped with 8 meter 
transmit/receive antennas and 4 meter receive only antennas. 
In 1977, the launching of OTS failed miserably. A European expert, Jacques 
Dessaucy, reported that the project was sabotaged by the U.S.A. since it 
was competing with similar American projects (10). 
The African response to this growing competition on the international 
telecommunications market was, at best, ambiguous. Actually, the African 
governments were divided by a deep political and ideological crisis. 
Furthermore, they did not have the opportunity nor perhaps the political 
wisdom to carefully evaluate the situation of their respective 
telecommunications sectors and translate into facts without any further 
delay the goal for unifying their telecommunications policies. A previous 
unified attempt to cope with telecommunications problems was present 
through the creation by 14 African countries mostly "francophone", of the 
Union Africaine et Malgache des Poster et Telecommunications (African and 
Malagasy Union of Posts and Telecommunications) in September 1961 
(Antananarivo, Madagascar After its reconstruction in 1975 and 
Madagascar's withdrawal, along with two other countries, the Union 
presently called Union Africaine des Pontes et Telecommunications (African 
Union of Posts and Telecommunications) focused on fostering cooperation 
between member countries in technical and policy matters and between ITU 
and the Union (11). 
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The omnipresence of West European and North American consulting f irms or 
multinational organizations will be confirmed later on (12) while the OAU, 
PATU, URTNA and the UAPT failed to autonomously conduct a coherent 
telecommunications strategy assessing the present and future needs of 
the continent, and taking the proper steps to overcome the existing 
impediments. 
Stiff competition opposed the ITU and Intelsat. The strategy of the latter 
was to accelerate the construction of ground stations in thirty-six 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as of January 1981 while the former 
favored the extension to a maximum level of the terrestrial networks and 
the creation of a regional satellite system for Africa. However, Intelsat's 
"lowest cost approach to rural communications for Third World countries" 
was designed in such a manner that it met the preoccupations of the African 
countries for the deployment of hybrid telecommunications systems 
(combining terrestrial and spatial routes). From 1976 to 1981, five African 
countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, and Niger) leased transponder 
facilities for their domestic needs. The West European countries (mainly 
France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom) despite their decreasing 
financial capabilities and the decisive impact of the U.S. multinational 
firms on their respective economies and telecommunications systems, 
decided to accept Intelsat's challenge, at least on the surface, and in the 
hope of protecting their African preserves. 
The opportunity to evaluate the satellite telecommunications needs and 
projects of the UAPT member countries was again offered during the 
Satellite Telecommunications Colloquium held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast (21-24 
November 1978) under the sponsorship of the French Ministry of Technical 
Cooperation, the French Administration of Posts and Telecommunication, the 
Franco-German Group Symphony and the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales 
(the French NASA created in 1962 by the late General de Gaulle, a partisan 
of French autonomy in spatial matters). During this colloquium, the French 
participants voiced their concern about Intelsat's monopoly in 
intercontinental telecommunications by satellite and highlighted the 
benefits that could be derived by the African states from a regional 
satellite system under European leadership. 
After the creation of the Panaftel network it became necessary to 
coordinate on a continental level the telecommunications investments 
undertaken by each member country. At the 31st Session of the OAU Council 
of Ministers held in Khartoum (July 1978) a Resolution (CM/Res. 654)DM) was 
adopted calling for the inclusion of PATU in the Panaftel Coordination 
Committee (13). The year 1979, preceded by the proclamation on 9 March 1978 
of the United Nations Transportation and Communications Decade in Africa 
(UNTACDA) for the period 1978-1988, was a round of tense negotiations and 
tough decisions for the African countries. 
In March, the European Space Agency demonstrated the operation of OTS-2 
at the Fifth Ministrerial Conference of ECA member countries held in Rabat. 
A 3 meter mobile antenna received French television programs as well as 
ESA films (14). 
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In May, the feasibility of a Regional Telecommunications Network by 
satellite for Africa was on the agenda of the Conference of African 
Ministers of Transports, Communications and Planning jointly sponsored by 
the UN-ECA and the OAU in Addis Ababa. The pzpJect was immediately ratified 
by UNTACDA with PATU and ECA as co-initiators (15) and will be known as 
AFROSAT. 
At the same time, a meetingheld in Kigali, Rwanda, under the auspices of the 
UAPT, decided to commission the feasibility of a regional satellite system 
for its members and eventually other African countries interested in the 
project then called AFSAT. The financial support of the European 
Development Fund was announced during the meeting (16). Meanwhile, Panaftel 
which was designed to link the OAU member States began a pre-feasibility 
study financed by the ITU and the German Society for Technical 
Cooperation. This study was commissioned at the time when the Panaftel 
Coordinating Committee meeting in Geneva encouraged an agreement between 
the ITU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The ITU 
was commissioned to carry out several studies and surveys of microwave 
links, a satellite earth station and a few telephone switching centers in 
West Africa (17). 
All these studies, and, more particularly, the AFROSAT and AFSAT projects 
were undertaken at a time when international relations were strained by 
the dominated nations call for a new world information order and a new 
international economic order. An unprecedented offensive was launched by 
the united front of the non-aligned countries during the UNESCO meetings. 
At the United Nations the same tense atmosphere prevailed. This episode 
of the international class struggle which stake was and still remains a 
balanced share of the communications resources and technology worldwide 
was a rewarding effort for many dominated countries willing to take a 
political advantage of the situation. Whichever tactical considerations 
were then on Africa's political agenda, the compromising stand of most 
African countries and the lack of coordination of their positions in the 
international fora was an outstanding fact. Black Africa s surprising 
silence at the 1979 WARC should be traced to a regrettable error of 
judgment concerning the future implications for a region which lacks a 
resource as vital as the frequency spectrum. 
Routine meetings multiplied in Africa during the year 1980 with the 
exception of two gatherings: the UNESCO's Intergovernmental Conference on 
Communications Policies in Africa (AFRICOM) held in Yaounde, Cameroon in 
July 22-31, 1980, and the Second Special Session of the Conference of 
Chiefs of State and Government (CCSG) held in Lagos (April 1980). The 
UNESCO's Conference, attended by twenty- eight Black African countries (out 
of 54 African states) adopted the Yaounde Declaration calling for more 
justice in the world economic and communication orders as well as for 
collective self-reliance, modernization and democratization of African 
communications policies. The declaration was worded in such a manner that 
everyone --"radical" as well as "moderate" countries-- would be sgtisfied. 
Recommendations 18 and 19 of the Declaration placed the ITU and the United 
Nations agencies in a leading position concerning the implementation of 
satellite communications projects in Africa. As to the Lagos Plan of Action 
established by the CCSG, it emphasized the necessity to "establish a 
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regional satellite communications system as a complement to the Panaftel 
system" (Chapter IV, paragraph 238) (18). 
In 1981, a Regional Seminar on Remote Sensing Applications and Satellite 
Communications for Education and Development was held in March 1981 at ECA 
headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
What all this meant was that strategies aiming at increasing levels of 
technology transfer in the area of satellite remote sensing from a few 
organizations and countries (Landsat and programs developed by the USA, 
USSR, India, the European Space Agency, Japan, etc.) to a large number of 
dominated countries were aggressively promoted and placed on the 
international agenda at a time when the dominated countries had not yet 
fully evaluated the benefits and the dangers linked with the use of remote 
sensing technology. In Africa, U.S.-AID promoted the Landsat program 
throughout the continent, particularly in Kenya while the France-managed 
SPOT system (Systeme Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre) which was 
scheduled to be operational in 1984 was actively tested in Burkina Faso. 
The success met by the Americans and the French in launching their remote 
sensing programs was partly due to the favorable openings displayed by the 
African countries. Indeed, subsequently to the ECA Council of Ministers' 
resolution 280 (XII) of February 1975, which called upon the Executive 
Secretary of the ECA to establish, as a matter of urgency, a remote 
sensing programme for Africa and to take practical steps to establish an 
earthbased regional center for receiving and processing data transmitted 
by remote sensing satellites, an African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC) was 
formally established with its headquarters in Bamako, Mali (19). 
In a 'Pre-feasibility Study on Appropriate Modern Telecommunications 
Technology for Integrated Rural Development in Africa" (20) financed by 
West Germany and carried out by DATACON and INTELPLAN a new version of 
a hybrid terrestrial and satellite systems approach was suggested The 
study proposed the use of a technology that "must be developed 
specifically for the African rural environment" and a "specifically designed 
dedicated satellite system." 
Another project carried out in 1981 by European consulting firms (Satel- 
Conseil, ITM and Bureau Yves Houssein) under the auspices of Eurospace 
closely monitored radio and television broadcasting in 17 target countries 
(13 "French speaking" UAPT members and 4 neighboring countries affected by 
the project). The study, financed by the European Development Fund, the 
French Aid and Cooperation Fund and the UK Ministry of Industry, concluded 
that the use of a regional satellite covering the 17 concerned countries 
may require 400 half-circuits in 1985 and 5,200 in 1994 for the national 
interurban traffic, and 5,300 half-circuits in 1985 and 49,200 in 1994 for 
rural traffic. These estimates represent an annual growth rate of 19 
percent as compared with the 6.5 percent rate suggested by ITU. The study 
known as the AFSAT project was ratified in Lome, Togo, in August 1981, by 
the UAPT Council and was presented as a basis for future studies. In the 
following years the UAPT, UPAT, and URTNA requested that Eurospace carry 
out a study on African countries to determine their needs. 
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Obviously, the dispersion of efforts and the omnipresence of rival 
consulting firms in the African regional or sub-regional satellite and 
telecommunications projects did not play in favor of the fifty-four OAU 
member States ready to venture into the satellite business. The 
Conference of Ministers of Transportation, Communications and Planning 
which took place in Addis Ababa in March 1981 recognized in Resolution 17 the 
necessity for unifying the different studies on communications satellites 
undertaken by African and international organizations. The Conference 
also laid out the steps that should guide the integration of these studies 
for designing a unique multifunctional satellite project (21). 
In a desperate effort to unify the wide variety of satellite planning 
policies adoptedby several regional and sub-regional agencies proclaiming 
their mutual solidarity but nevertheless defending conflicting 
perspectives, the African countries initiated intense negotiations in 1982. 
Previous legal dispositions were fertile grounds on which one could rely 
upon for further efforts to unify positions. On that respect, two legal 
acts, in particular, were an important step. Resolution 03/T adopted by the 
Ministerial Counsel meeting held in Dakar in 1980 suggested that "the AFSAT 
study should be a contribution of the UAPT to the continental satellite 
project supervised by PATU and the OAU." In 1981, the Lome Council of 
Ministries of the UAPT members created an AFSAT Coordinating Commmittee 
(Comite de Coordination et de Suivi AFSAT--CCS) whose task was to follow 
up on information search activities undertaken by signatories countries 
and to present to national telecommmunications authorities the technical 
and economic options foreseeable for orienting their policies (22). The 
first CCS meeting held in Brazzaville, Congo (7-8 September 1981) adopted 
the status of the AFSAT Coordinating Committee and prepared 
recommendations concerning the feasibility of a continental 
telecommunications satellite system. 
At the beginning of 1982 (12-30 January) the Second Conference of the PATU 
Plenipotentiaries held in Kinshasa discussed at length the AFROSAT 
project. Since this option was adopted by the Conference of the OAU Heads 
of State and Government in March 1978 the AFROSAT studies were not really 
convincing and did not capture the attention of the African governments. 
This failure can be traced to several factors and, in particular, to 
political and organizational problems. Politically, most of the African 
Heads of State did not believe in the immediate feasibility of a continental 
satellite system and preferred to direct their efforts towards the 
finalization of sub-regional projects (like the AFSAT system primarily 
controlled by the former French colonies). Furthermore the Pan-African 
Telecommunications Union, the only specialized agency of the OAU, was 
operating under severe budgetary constraints. The Pan-African 
organization was almost left with empty headquarters and without the basic 
software facilities. 
On 16-18 March 1982, an Inter-Agencies meeting held in Addis Ababa was co- 
sponsored by the OAU, ECA, ITU, UAPT, PATU and URTNA. The principle of a 
multifunctional satellite was then reiterated. This signal as the one sent 
a year before by the Conference of Ministers of Transportation, 
Communication and Planning (Addis Ababa, March 1981) were directed to the 
ITU. This meant that the African countries lost confidence in the ability of 
the ITU to help them implement a satellite system that could properly serve 
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the telecommunications needs of the continent. Besides, the ITU's pre- 
feasibility study on rural telecommunications in Africa raised the 
suspicion of most of the African experts involved in the negotiations at 
the continental level. The delegate from Mali, for example, who was sitting 
at the Intelsat Counsel of Signatories as Governor for Group II and who was 
also Director of Telemali stated that the ITU did not want to work for 
Africa. He added that the notion of rural telecommunications advocated by 
the ITU was vague and that the ITU's study on rural telecommunications 
satellite was likely to be rejected because the African countries could not 
afford to pay for a satellite primarily designed for rural areas. The Malian 
expert had also the feeling that the ITU and West Germany (the funding 
country for the project) tried to influence African telecommunications 
policies (23). 
Such suspicions were not the fact of isolated personalities. In fact, 
following the June 1982 meeting where the CAU, ITU and FCA agreed on the 
terms of references of the AMTT/IRD feasibility study being undertaken by 
the ITU and after the First Meeting of the Inter-Institutions Coordination 
Committee on Appropriate Telecommunications forthe Developmentof Africa 
under OAU's initiative (Addis Ababa, 25-27 August 1982), it became clear 
that many African telecommunications organizations did not agree with ITU's 
prescriptions. 
The ITU pre-feasibility study on the application of modern appropriate 
telecommunications technology to rural and integrated development was 
completed in 1982. Conclusions of the study were presented at the Meeting 
of the Intergovernmental Experts (Addis Ababa, 22-26 March 1982). The 
objectives of the study were to assess the rural telecommunications needs 
(including radio and television) and to undertake technical and economic 
surveys for the implementation of a continental satellite system serving 
the rural and remote areas and subsidiarily the interurban links inside the 
countries and the i.ntra-African links between OAU member states (24). The 
ITU study also insisted on the urgent necessity for carrying out 
feasibility studies on a country by country basis in order to save time and 
to avoid the depreciation of the results obtained between the feasibility 
and the pre-feasibility phases (25). 
The First Meeting of the Inter-Institutional Coordinating Committee on 
Appropriate Telecommunications for the Development of Africa started in 
a tense atmosphere. In a message read to the assembly, PATU's General 
Secretary contested the legality of the meeting. This contestation was 
rejected by the assembly and the ITU study was discussed. The UAPT 
representatives looked at the study but they said they were not mandated 
to approve it. They recalled that UAPT's own Coordinating Committee had 
a study underway with different terms of references and that, besides, the 
ITU study should be discussed in a meeting between the different 
interested agencies. In their turn, the URTNA delegates rejected the ITU 
suggestions on an exchange of radio-television programs by satellite and 
the implementation of a data transmission network (PADIS-SAT). The 
reasons given by the URTNA delegates was that the ITTs propositions on 
radio-television were already included in the UNTACDA's program and that 
their inclusion in the satellite project was not cost effective and would 
ultimately be rejected by the African countries (26). 
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The Second AFSAT CCS Meeting (Dakar, Senegal, 18-19 May 1982) was an 
important turning point in the organizational undertakings of the African 
continent with regard to the implementation of a regional satellite system. 
For the first time, delegates from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
met with their UAPT colleagues. The results of the survey performed by the 
British firm GTS for the U.K. Department of Industry in Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone were presented to the delegates. In the final 
communique the desire to harmonize the studies undertaken by the 
"francophone" and "anglophone" countries was once again restated. The 
parties agreed that the African telecommunications organizations would 
avoid commissioning similar studies in the same countries. Finally, the 
participants took note of the intention displayed by the French, British and 
Italian governments to support the AFSAT projects in a coordinated manner 
(27). 
Translating into facts their will to coordinate their telecommunications 
undertakings in Africa the French and British did their best to accelerate 
the pre-feasibility studies under their responsibility in order to 
completely undermine the efforts deployed by the ITU/Weet Germany 
partnership and the growing influence of Intelsat. While the British 
presented the results of their survey at the Second AFSAT CCS Meeting, the 
French consulting agency (Satel-Conseil) made available at the Third "SAT 
CCS Meeting (Dakar, 5-7 January 1983) the conclusions of a study entitled: 
"African Telecommunications Satellite: Economic Impact of the Main 
Parameters in the Useful Load". The study predicted that a high powered 
satellite is best suited to the African environment. It allows a better use 
of, available frequency resources and it is cost effective with regard to 
total investments including the cost of the earth and spatial segments (28t 
In subsequent years, the AFSAT project was postponed. There was a long 
list of failures between the 1960s and the 1980s which culminated in the 
political difficulties experienced by the African States for implementing 
the Regional African Satellite Communication System (RASCOM). The last 
meeting held in Abuja under Nigeria's leadership in February 1991 showed 
once again serious political differences between so-called "francophone" 
and "anglophone" countries. More than any other country, Nigeria is 
committed to fullfilling its goals for national unity through the 
ope rationalization of a domestic communications satellite system fully 
integrated into this regional protect. Nigeria's territorial size and the 
magnitude of population pressure on already strained national resources 
compells her political leaders to find adequate solutions to the country's 
chaotic internal and external communications links. 
2. Africa and the ITU 
The ITU organized a meeting in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia (October 20-November 
10, 1972) where the results of a pre-investment survey were discussed. At 
this meeting, despite the fact that the West African region was not yet 
fully surveyed, arteries of the Panaftel network were detailed in a design 
suggesting the linking of about 20,000 kilometers of international 
transmission routes across the continent and 18 international switching 
centers. Most of these links were designed as medium-to-high-capacity 
microwave relay systems. 
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The ITU also conducted several studies. One of them, called the ITU Plan of 
Lagos, was carried out in 1971 and was a general plan for the development 
of the regional network for the period 1970-1978. Traffic forecasts were 
provided on telephone, telegraph, and telex (29). Another ITU survey of the 
Panaftel network predicted traffic forecasts covering the period 1975- 
1990 (30). Some years later, a telecommunications engineer from Kenya, Mr. 
Phillip Okundi would label these forecasts as inaccurate. He suggested 
that "the actual traffic requirements were very much underestimated by as 
much as 50 percent or more (31). 
The study carried out by the International Telecommunications Union and 
approved by the Third African Telecommunications Conference in 1980 (32) 
suggested the following goals: a telephone density of 1.0 per 100 
population and one public call office (PCO) per 10,000 ruralpopulation so 
that each inhabitant is within five km of an installation. 
The ITU study suggested a target supply and demand of 41,260 PCOs by the 
year 2000 for a rural population totalling 413 million in order to reach a 
telephone density of LO per 100 persons and one PCO per 10,000 persons 
"just to meet general requirements," i.e., a supply level well below the 
demands of self-reliant economies using optimal capacities of integrated 
telecommunications systems. 
The determination of basic service needs for the period 1980-2000 has been 
postulated around three scenarios representing the rudimentary, normal 
and optimistic growth patterns. Under the Rudimentary Scenario telephone 
demand would increase by 72,400 additional telephones in 1980 and by 
110,700 additional telephones in 2000 while the PCO form of supply would 
dominate And special user requirements would be met only selectively. 
Under the Normal Scenario additional telephones number 243,000 for 1980 
and 378,540 in 2000. PCOs would represent only 6 percent of all rural 
telephones with an annual growth rate averaging 216 percent. The 
Optimistic Scenario targets 243,000 additional telephones in 1980 and 
1,072,760 in 2000 with an annual growth rate averaging 7.81 percent. 
The total amount of traffic which might be presently generated in Sub- 
Saharan rural Africa was estimated by the ITU study at around 20,000 
Erlangs, an Erlang being a traffic unit indicating the number of all minutes 
per busy hours. The estimate was based on a rural population totalling 252 
million inhabitants theoretically living in 390.000 villages. Village size 
would vary from 400 to 10,000 inhabitants. It was assumed that the 
smallest villages (18 percent of the total population) were located within 
5 km of other villages. According to projected estimates of the study the 
additional number of telephones required under the Normal Scenario would 
total 270,000. 
The objectives determined by the ITU study raised many unresolved 
questions in the validity of Mrs recommendations. First, the presupposed 
growth trend (6.53 percent per annum) implied a model of economic growth 
which does not vary with time or which will not be affected by more than 
eventual social and political changes. Second, the "realistic" target 
supply of one DEL per 100 inhabitants and one PCO per 10,000 rural 
population was, in fact, a status quo target which undoubtedly would have 
placed Africa's telecommunications systems in a difficult position, 
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especially when one bears in mind the fact that the ITU's target for the 
year 2000 did not even match the 1979 telephone density in Latin American 
(3.5 DEL per 100 inhabitants), or in Europe (14.6 DTL per 100 inhabitants), let 
alone Japan (31.5) and North America (40.2) (33). 
The ITU planned period (1990-95) for the launching of a regional satellite 
(AFROSAT) which would be owned and operated by foreigners indicated that 
up to the year 2000 the majority of rural populations would be, as stressed 
by the 1981 ITU report, "without any telecommunications even of poor 
quality" (34). This final conclusion of the report dispelled the validity of 
the general recommendations contained in the study. It showed, in any case, 
the limits of the telecommunications model then foreseen for Africa. That 
is why ITU's recommendations were rejected by most African countries 
decided to avoid the dangerous economic and political assumptions 
ingrained in ITU's report. 
The following points can be' stressed to explain Africa's rejection of the 
project; 
L The project failed to reach the proclaimed objective "of significantly 
increasing the supply of rural telephones" since by the year 2000 the 
270,000 additional telephones planned for the hypothetical number of 252 
million rural population would correspond to only LO per 1,000 rural 
poulation (or 0.5 per 500 rural population) as compared to the present 
average of 1.0 line per 500 inhabitants in the 17 UAPT member countries (35). 
2. The smallest villages with an average population of 200 people were 
ignored in the ITU estimates. The rationale behind such a decision was 
questionable because such villages numbered 232,000 in the ITU report and 
represented 46.5 million rural people, i.e., a work force three times 
numerically bigger than that of France. 
3. The then proposed number of additional telephones (1 telephone per 
village with a population of 400-1,000 people; 3 telephones per villages 
with 1,000 to 4,000 inhabitants; and 9 telephones per village with 4,000 to 
10,000 inhabitants) presupposed a model of economic growth based on the 
dichotomy between villages and urban centers when the on-going economic 
model should have been completely reversed if Africa was to avoid being 
totally recolonized by the year 2000. 
4. The assumed average distance of 5 kms between the hypothetical number 
of 390,000 villages was not realistic, at least, in the Sahel where under 
the combined effects of national and intra-regional migration and recent 
ecological changes (drought, rainfall patterns, etc.), distances between 
villages have considerably increased during this past decade. 
Consequently, the national and international traffic forecasts made in the 
study were suspect since they did not take into account the continent's 
constantly changing ecological and geographical map. 
5. The determination of basic service needs reflected in the Normal 
Scenario was based on the preconceived idea that one PCO per 10,000 rural 
population and 8 telephones per 10,000 special users (probably including 
individual users and official units like schools, hospitals, etc.) could have 
met demand in rural areas. Such estimates had nothing to do with objective 
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measurements. They corresponded to a subjective assumption superimposed 
on seemingly objective measures. 
This last recommendation could have left Africa with outdated 
telecommunications systems by the year 2000 when other nations would be 
industrializing outer space with powerful solar satellites and industrial 
units processing raw materials extracted from other planets (36) 
Moreover, the use of 27,000 PCOs in 1980 and 41,260 PCOs in 2000 meant that 
even if a dedicated satellite system was used by the Sub-Saharan 
countries, national telecommunications systems would still heavily rely on 
hybrid systems dominated by very expensive microwave links. The limits of 
such hybrid systems have been revealed by the costly ventures observed 
in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, etc. 
In addition to these general observations one should refer to the specific 
critiques suggested by a Washington corporation--Satellite Systems 
Engineering, Inc.--in a "Review of the ITU Study" prepared for Intelsat in 
March 1982 (37, 38). 
3. Africa and Intelsat 
As a result of the lack of coherent telecommunications planning strategies 
and a poorly coordinated move into the communications satellite business 
the African countries are facing one of the biggest dilemmas of the post- 
colonial era. Given the strategic importance of the telecommunications 
sector in their socio-economic development these countries are now 
obliged, under the pressing necessity to re-build national networks, to 
make a drastic choice. They must choose between the uncertainties of 
domestic systems using Intelsat leased transponders and the prospect of 
usingtheir own regional communication satellites for domestic and regional 
purposes. 
Raphael Anasiudu detailed statistics showing that most of the African 
nations communicated via Intelsat more with their former colonial powers 
than with any other OECD nation. Further, the study suggested that the 
remaining part of communications taking place followed colonial background 
(i.e., "francophone" countries communicationg with other French speaking 
countries, formerPortuguese territories clusteringwith otherPortuguese 
speaking countries in Africa, etc) (40). 
I have updated some of Anasiudu's basic findings through a compilation and 
analysis of Intelsat's System Status Report for the early 1980s (41). Table 
I below indicates that the African countries used the Intelsat network in 
accordance withneocolonial ties linkingthem to dominant capitalist powers. 
While intra-regional traffic is negligible the volume of international 
telecommunications traffic (for telephone signals, data transfer and 
television broadcasting services) illustrates thescale of competition 
between dominant world powers and lesser powers within the African market 
place. A few exceptions (South Africa, for instance) are explained by the 
fact that other channels of communications are used by the Intelsat user 
country. South Africa is linked to the United Kingdom --the dominant 
imperialist power in the country-- by a submarine cable. This explains why 
the United States accounts for most of the outgoing calls through the 
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Intelsat system. Table II based on Intelsat's traffic data shows how the 
African countries used the Intelsat network from 1983 to 1987. These 
countries used roughly only 4,000 circuits for intra-African 
communications that is 15 percent of the total number of circuits for 
domestic and international communications. 
Using other sources, particularly AT&T figures, one can reach the same 
conclusions (see Table III). 
The maJor conclusions arising from these facts is that Africans do not 
communicate between themselves. The bulk of their international 
telecommunications traffic is directed towards former European colonial 
powers, the United States and Japan. 
The African countries' access to political independence in the early 1960'8 
coincided with two important events in the international political arena: 
the Cold War was still commanding the march of events and the battle for 
space conquest reached a new height with the duopoly exercised by the two 
super powers. In August 1971, the Intelsat Agreement and the Operating 
Agreement replaced the interim arrangements. According to Pelton, the 
involvement of giant multinational corporations such as Hughes Aircraft, 
Philco-Ford (now Ford Aerospace and Communciations Corporation), TRW, 
Lockheed, General Electric, British Aircraft, Aerospatiale, Thomson CSF, 
Meyser-schmidt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), General Telephone & Electric, ITT, 
Maconi, Siemens, Nipon Electric, Mitsubishi and many, many others in the 
satellite and earth stations markets signalled the near disruption of the 
international market controlled by Intelsat 88). It also meant the 
proliferation of regional satellite systems controlled by these 
multinational corporations. For national security reasons member 
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) decided to launch their own systems. Japan and the European 
countries, in particular, successfully designed their own sytems while the 
construction of the French-German vehicle Ariane largely threatened for 
the first time the monopoly held by the U.S. National Administration Space 
Agency in commercial communications satellite business. In the meantime, 
the Arabs and the Africans were actively planning to develop regional 
systems while India, perhaps more than any other Third World country, was 
animated by a powerful will to design and operate her own hybrid 
communications satellite despite a maJor presence of Ford Aerospace in its 
national protect. 
Given the desperate situation prevailing in their countries, particularly 
at the level of their terrestrial telecommunications facilities, the African 
countries decided to "go satellite" hoping to solve immediate and short 
term problems. 
The advantages gained by the African countries in their commitment to 
Intelsat's institutional and commercial agreements are of two orders: 
1) The leased transponder optfon and the SPADE system available in the 
Intelsat system are short term alternatives to Africa's urgent need for 
increasingly growingdomestic and international telecommunications traffic. 
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2) The immediate financial gains offered by the relatively cheap rate of 
access to the Intelsat network are an advantage that cannot be matched by 
the use of conventional terrestrial technology. 
In the past decade, the number of African countries using Intelsat services 
has steadily increased. Such a massive participation in the Intelsat 
system, however, causes serious problems with regard to Africa's national 
security and long term telecommunications needs. 
With an 80 percent increase in 1982 in the number of Intelsat transponders 
leased for national systems, which accounted for 10 percent of Intelsat's 
total revenue (40), Africa paid a high price for its communications by 
satellite. A rented transponder costs around 800,000 dollars per year in 
1984. The total amount of money spent by the African countries in the 
installation of earth stations, for example, is considerable. With a total 
number of 39 standard A stations valued at 700 million U.S. dollars, and 25 
standard B stations at a unit price of 4 million dollars, the African 
countries disbursed over the past two decades a total sum close to one 
billion U.S. dollars. If we add to this expenses necessitated by non- 
standard domestic earth stations (total number: 110), the maintenance and 
operation costs of the national space and ground segments, etc., the total 
amount of money spent by the African nations is considerable, especially 
when compared to the total capital (1 billion U.S. dollars) invested in 1978 
by 102 countries in the Intelsat network, including satellites, earth 
stations and installations (41). The situation is all the more favorable to 
the launching of an African satellite system given that the recent 
development of reusable rocket launchers, such as NASA's Columbia Space 
Shuttle, could lower the launching and installation costs of a regional 
satellite system by two-thirds (42). 
Further, financially, it would be much more profitable for the African 
countries to pool their capital resources and to spend it in their own 
regional hybrid system rather than investing in Intelsat's transponder 
lease services. 
Technological self-reliance cannot be achieved by the African countries in 
the present framework of Intelsat technology transfer policy. In almost 
three decades of active participation in the multinational satellite 
organization the African countries have still not been able to take 
advantage, even on a modest scale, of the technical and training 
cooperation scheme made available to all Intelsat signatories. Besides, 
the lack of direct involvement in designing, operating, and maintaining their 
own satellite system unfortunately delays the necessary acquisition of 
scientific and practical experience in this strategic field. The benefit of 
important side effects generatedby autochtonouscommunications satellite 
activities in the African countries is also delayed. For instance, the 
development of communications satellite activities is accompanied by 
steady advances in computer hardware and software given the central role 
played by computer assisted programs in any satellite venture. 
By controlling their own regional system, the African countries can reach 
a greater flexibility in the use of the satellite system, gaining more 
effective coverage of their territories and better adaptability to thin 
route conditions prevailing in large areas of the continent. 
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It could be advantageous for the African countries opting to receive the 
services of the geostationary Gorizont satellites at a cheaper rate to 
join in the Soviet-controlled Intersputnik System. Many African countries 
(Libya, Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar) tryed to seek membership in the 
Intersputnik system. Other users like Algeria were not members of 
Intersputnik but used Gorizont satellites to communicate with Intersputnik 
member states (43). It seems that up to the Gorbatchev era, the African 
countries have not used Intersputnik services for political reasons 
coupled with the fact that the Soviet system was not attractive in its 
early version with the non-geosynchronous and expensive Molniya 2 series 
of satellites (44). But the recent collapse of the Soviet empire and the 
state of chaos prevailing in the now defunct Soviet Union makes it difficult 
to suggest accurate predictions on this particular respect, at least in the 
short term. 
The African countries will sooner or later be forced to weigh the cost- 
effectiveness of their participation in the Intelsat system especially with 
regard to the new conditions created by the proliferation of regional 
satellite systems, the emergence of Europe in 1992 and the consequences 
of deregulations of national telecommunications markets in the United 
States and elsewhere. Many factors will prevail in future African attempts 
to break the vicious circle of dependency of their telecommunications 
sector vis a vis external decision centers. Choices in such matters will not 
be easy. In the late 1980s, for instance, a few African countries were 
willing to evaluate their choice of the Intersputnik system on the basis of 
the following factors. 
Due to the fact that Soviet Gorizont satellites were more powerful than 
the Intelsat V satellites, Intersputnik compatible earth terminals could 
use 12-meter diameter antennas (45). In addition, Intersputnik services 
were considerably less expensive than Intelsat's. 1984 estimates 
suggested that the lease of one Intersputnik voice circuit costs 30,000 
gold francs (11,615 U.S. dollars) annually while the same capacity acquired 
from the Intelsat system costs 50,000 gold francs (19,358 U.S. dollars) (46). 
Finally, Intersputnik expanded its services on a global scale (Statsionar 
4 location and Statsionar 5 location are respectively positioned above the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean) (47). It should be added that with the 
active experimentation of what is believed to be a prototype of the Soviet 
space shuttle, the USSR could soon be in a position to significantly 
challenge the Western world in the race for the control of the international 
satellite market. A U.S. congressional report suggested that the Soviets 
are developing a 10- to 20-ton space vehicle that could grow to a 'heavy 
lift reusable shuttle able to carry twice the payload' that the U.S. 
shuttles Columbia and Challenger have taken into orbit (48). 
Another factor that can be seen as a disadvantage to Black Africa's 
exclusive participation in the Intelsat system lies in the fact that the 
African countries are waisting their frequency resources either by not 
using them or by reprehensible complacency. In any case, the- danger of 
exclusion from the global use of the frequency spectrum resources (49) is 
a real one, as revealed by the successive World Administration Radio 
Conferences (WARC), especially WARC 1979. 
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Since the time when the International Telecommunications Union recognized 
in 1973 that "radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are 
limited natural resources" (Art.33 of the Malaga-Torremolinos Convention), 
the battle for world leadership in communications matters has been largely 
shaped by the technical, legal, financial and military aspects commanding 
the control of the geostationary arc and the radio frequency spectrum. 
The Minister of Information of the Sudan portrayed this conflicting 
situation very well when he said that the developed countries have 90 
percent of the spectrum and 10 percent of the population while the Third 
World countries have 90 percent of the population and 10 percent of the 
spectrum (50). 
The use 'of the orbit-spectrum resource should be very high on the 
telecommunications policy agenda of the African countries. The longer 
these countries wait before either directly using or protecting their 
share of the geostationary arc the more likely they will have to negotiate 
the use of this resource under very unfavorable conditions. 
This situation is aggravated by Africa's absence of involvement in an 
autonomous regional satellite system and the weakness of her 
participation in the ITU frequency allocations for satellite 
communications. The geostationary orbit will soon reach a state of near 
saturation given the proliferation of domestic, regional and military 
communications satellites in an arc already showing signs of saturation 
and/or misutilization of the orbital slot locations (51). The 4/6 GHz location 
already shows that saturation of the orbital arc is near capacity while the 
11-12/14 GHz band indicates a state 'of advanced saturation when the 
projected use of the geostationary allotments will be effective. Current 
forecasts show the acceleration of the trend towards saturation of the 
geostationary arc in the C-Band and the K-Band. This does not leave any 
doubt as to the present and future overcrowded aspect of the 
geostationary orbit although recent technological adavances do suggest 
that the advent of giant platforms and new possibilities offered by 
multifunctional interfacingbetween several satellite systems will preempt 
current concerns on the overcrowding of the geostationary orbit. 
Even if this scenario became entirely plausible, the African continent could 
be left with no more than two orbital parking lots planned to be used by 
Nigeria and two other allotments reserved by the Arab countries including 
the Northern African countries all particpating in the Arabsat system. 
Thus, with an estimated population of 600 million people, one of the largest 
emerged landscapes and the richest reservoir of natural resources in the 
world, Black Africa will have at best at her disposal in the 19908 three 
orbital slot locations (two locations for the more than hypothetical 
launching of the Nigerian National Satellite 1 and 2 series and possibly 
another orbital location for the planned RASCOM system which is already 
weakened by conflicting African policies) on a theoretial total number of 
1,800 orbital 'parking spaces (52). According to the U.S. based Satellite 
Communications magazine, the number of commercial, experimental, 
meteorological and military satellites may have reached by 1990 a grand 
total of 1,186 vehicles, that is to say, nearly 66 percent of the available 
geostationary resource (53). By the end of the century, therefore, the 
Black African countries' share of the geostationary arc may represent only 
0.3 percent of this resource ! 
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The Western capitalist world basically perceives its spatial and 
communications satellite undertakings as a replica of the strategies of 
telecommunications penetration enforced during the mercantilist and the 
monopolist periods when terrestrial telegraph and telephone networks and 
submarine cable lines were used as technological tools meant to powerfully 
back European military, commercial and political interests in colonized 
countries. Intelsat was conceived in this line of thinking. It used to be a 
saf a financial venture, particularly at a time when the dominated countries 
did not have the technological means and did not meet the political 
conditions for self-reliance in the communications satellite business. 
From an economic standpoint the Intelsat formula was a powerful incentive 
to strengthen the commercial activities between the Western world and the 
dominated countries. 
A colonial pact regulates relationships between Africa and the capitalist 
world. While the French are doing their best to strengthen their political 
and commercial ties with their former African colonies, the English and 
Americans are trying to have a say in Nigeria's attempt to launch a 
dedicated satellite. However, within the European Space Agency the French 
and English and their West European partners are willing to jointly control 
the design, operation and maintenance of the planned launching of RASCOM, 
a regional satellite system conceived as the technological backbone of a 
European-African entity. 
After missing the Canadian opportunity, the Europeans are extremely 
anxious to keep under control their African preserves (54). In this regard, 
the competition between the U.S. Space Shuttle and the French launcher 
Ariane takes primary importance. The United States, and particularly 
COMSAT --Intelsat's godfather-- does not favor the existence of a regional 
system in Africa because it could well mean Intelsat's collapse and a hard 
time for the U.S. telecommunications industry. 
The Reagan administration's move towards the opening of the international 
satellite communications market to U.S. private telecommunications firms 
has generated serious contradictions between Intelsat and corporate 
America (55). The conflict has been crystallized around the merciless 
struggle between Orion Satellite Corporation and Intelsat (56). In a study 
prepared for Orion by Dale N. Hatfield Associates of Boulder, Colorado, 
Orion refuted Intelsat officials' argument that the consortiums averaged 
rate structure operated as a subsidy to Third World members and that this 
would be destroyed by approval of Oriori s proposal to build and operate its 
own trans-Atlantic satellite system. 
Before the accusation that Intelsat is not subsidizing rates for its poorer 
members as it claims and that the subsidy may be 
flowing from Third World countries to the capitalist world, the Comsat and 
Intelsat officials have argued that: 
1) Intelsat planning hinges on the concept of a single global system. Over 
two and a quarter billion dollars is being invested in future systems, and 
the viability of this investment... rests to a large extent on the 
transatlantic traffic. Fragmenting that market would entail serious 
financial consequences for Intelsat members and non-member users alike in 
the form of presumably hefty rate hikes (57). 
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2) U.S. approval of the private satellite corporations applications to build 
satellite systems for the North Atlantic would surely damage U.S. 
international and foreign relations interests with the Soviet Union gaining 
from the development due to its Louch series of eight satellites intended 
to provide services comparable if not superior to Intelsat (58). 
3) From a financial and economic standpoint it would be a disaster for the 
interests of the United States government and its telecommunications 
industry to open the international satellite market to private competition. 
Indeed, before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, COMSAT 
President Joseph V. Charyk pointed out that the United States greatly 
benefited from Intelsat"s growth. Since 1964, about 939 million U.S. dollars 
have been spent or allocated for satellite construction and more than 83 
percent of that (778 million dollars) has gone to U.S. manufacturers (59). 
In addition, NASA has been paid some 700 million dollars to launch these 
satellites. COMSAT's President added that the United States contributed 
about one-fourth the capital costs of Intelsat, yet received over 75 
percent of the contracts it then awarded. These contracts significantly 
contributed in placing the United States aerospace industry in a worldwide 
leadership position. Further, Charyk said, "there is no question that our 
involvement in the Intelsat system has benefited the United States 
significantly in our balance of trade" (60). 
This testimony shows how important Intelsat is to U.S. commercial and 
strategic interests. It also shows the considerable profits made on the 
back of Third World countries and particularly the African countries 
located in the Atlantic region. 
In return, the benefits gained by the African countries in the Intelsat 
venture are rather meagre. The Intelsat Governor for Africa (Group II) and 
also former Chairman of the Malian Telecommunications Office in the early 
1980s, suggested that Intelsat is not equipped to cover Africa's domestic 
communications needs. He further contended that from a national security 
standpoint the situation could have damaging consequences for the African 
countries unable to cope with increasing telecommunications needs which 
are crucial militarily, economically and from an administrative standpoint. 
The African representative also questionned what he called the "shameful 
axes" referring to the telecommunications axes between Paris or London and 
the major African capital cities (61). Pushing this reasoning to its logical 
conclusion, an Ethiopian expert and Intelsat staff member raised the 
following question: "If we cannot design our own spacecraft, 
communications satellites, etc., are we really independent" (62) ? 
The question is all the more pertinent that before international appetites 
the African countries are virtually defenseless and do not have much 
choice between the "global domestic satellite system"(Glodom) concept 
suggestedby the ITU and the "global village" formula advocated by Intelsat. 
The ITU position is that "Glodom would use dedicated transponders or 
satellites to provide thin-route telephony and other services to rural 
areas of developing countries". The ITU further contends that Glodom would 
satisfy a need not only currently addressed "since at this time Intelsat 
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isn't effective or economical for many domestic service networks required 
in some Third World countries." This means that the low Intelsat edge EIRP 
requires large antennas raising earth station costs up to 2 million U.S. 
dollars each in 1984 (63). 
The central objective of Intelsat is "to design, build and operate a system 
of geosynchronous satellites and supporting ground facilities that 
supplies public telephony, data, and television service to its 109 member 
nations". The Intelsat Agreement has established a policy of providing 
domestic space segment requirements under one of three possible allotment 
agreements: as a five-year lease for a full 36 MHz transponder, as a one- 
year, non-preemptible leased service, renewable each year, and on a 
circuit-by-circuit basis (64). Before the threats of regional communication 
satellite proliferation and the controversial aspect of the famous Article 
M in the Intelsat Agreement (65), the Intelsat authorities are anxious 
about the future of the organization. 
Almost immediately after being elected Director General of Intelsat, 
Richard R. Colino warned the international arena that "it should not come 
as a surprise that Intelsat is concerned that it might have to raise rates 
and suffer revenue shortfalls if other systems are permitted to serve the 
heavy traffic streams, such as the North Atlantic". The prospect for 
higher tariff rates in Intelsat delivery services could well mean that in 
the 1990's the African countries would not be in a position to meet their 
growing telecommunications needs, especially if the African countries are 
not able to launch their own regional communications satellite system by 
the end of the millenium. 
A final point may be raised in the review of the disadvantages associated 
with Intelsat monopoly on the communications satellite traffic needs of the 
African countries. It relates to Africa's national security demands and the 
extent to which they are met in the framework of the Intelsat system, 
especially in the face of attempts by the Pretoria regime in a recent past 
to monitor or even block telephone calls from Burundi whose communications 
signals were routed via earth stations located in the country of apartheid. 
It has also been suggested that the U.S. National Security Agency has 
placed receiving antennas in virtually all the "hot points" where the 
international calls routed in the United States through the Intelsat earth 
stations are received. In this manner, the NSA monitors all the outgoing 
and incoming communications signals presenting a definite significance for 
U.S. "national interest", a notion including spying activities from an 
economic, military and political standpoint (66). 
Where does Africa stand in the battle for world leadership through the 
control of scientific research in commmunications matters ? One would 
hardly find elements of answers to these questions in the ongoing African 
telecommunications policies. It would be a serious mistake to separate 
discussions on national security from any present or future 
telecommunications venture in the African continent. Africa's massive 
participation in the Intelsat system must, therefore , be evaluated with 
regard to the protection of the African countries' national security 
interests. 
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This all too often forgotten truth appeared clearly in the 1970's when 
Nigeria, with the support of Libya, firmly envisaged to require a West 
African satellite for use with its domestic earth terminals and for lease 
of satellite transponders to other West African countries. The project 
fell short, however, because Nigeria was faced with the consequences of oil 
recession on its cash reserves and also because the international banking 
community was reluctant to f inane a venture that would have been a threat 
to the interests of Intelsat and the multinational corporations controlling 
the African telecommunications market. 
The confusion presently surrounding Africa's venture in the satellite 
business is aggravated by the fact that until very recently the AFROSAT 
and AFSAT projects were a political dividing line between "franeophone" and 
"anglophone" African countries despite official proclamations on African 
unity. 
It is unlikely, according to the best estimates that the RASCOM system will 
be operational before the year 2000 at the earliest. By 1985 the African 
countries had already leased a total of at least 36 transponders which 
represented the largest part of leased capacities in the Intelsat system. 
The implication of such a developement was a new stage towards Intelsat's 
increasing influence on African telecommunications systems and policies. 
The European nations have already come to the conclusion that 
their full participation in the Intelsat system is harmful to their economic 
development and national security requirements. Consequently, they are 
actively programming, or have already completed launching of their own 
regional and domestic communications satellite systems. Through the 
RASCOM project, the African countries are somewhat ingraining their action 
in the international trend commanding the evolution of satellite 
communications ownership and control. 
4. PANAFTEL; A Poiaonned Heritage 
Total investments required to finance the proposed Panaftel network, which 
would entail the establishment of 20 international switching centres and 
33 international telex switching centers supported by around 30,000 kms 
transmission routes consisting of high frequency, microwaves and coaxial 
cable systems was estimated at a cost of 100 million U.S. dollars (1972). 
More recent figures suggest that the cost of such a network would cost at 
least twice as much as the initial estimate. If one includes the project of 
the 5,000 kms submarine cables .linking Ca4dblanca to Dakar, Abidjan and 
Lagos, and the investments required by the 38 Intelsat earth stations 
equipped with A or B size antennas as of 1982, as well as a growing number 
of African countries planning to lease Intelsat transponders for domestic 
use, the cost of an integrated telecommunications network could cost to 
the African countries several billion dollars at the turn of the century. 
For the time being, the project is progressing slower than predicted, in the 
face of the reluctance of bilateral lending institutions to finance 
ventures with a supposedly low internal rate of return and the handicap 
represented by the fact that the countries negotiate separately the 
construction of Panaftel's different sections. 
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By the end of 1981, it was expected that the Panafte1 network would have 
40,000 kms of microwave systems in operation which would have 
corresponded to an increase of more than 12 percent in a decade (67). In 
order to evaluate the meaning of these figures one must refer to the 
historical circumstances under which the Panaftel networkwas created, and 
more specifically to the terms of the negotiations which took place between 
the African countries and the other interested parties. 
Before the unwillingness of the world's major lending sources to finance 
the construction of the Panafte 1 network on a multilateral basis and under 
reasonable financial terms, the African countries accepted to negotiate 
the Panaftei project on the basis of bilateral agreements. This implied 
costly risks of conflicting decisions in the design of the network and the 
promotion of intra-African communications on a sub-regional scale. 
Besides, the division of Africa into zones of influences persisted with the 
project while regions already well provided with telecommunications 
services received all the benefits to the detriment of the more disabled 
countries and areas (68). 
Another major shortcoming of the Panaftel project was the absence of 
serious concern for the incompatibility of new techniques with existing 
systems (69) and the absence of manufacturing capabilities even for some 
types of peripheral equipment and some basic plant like poles, cable ducts, 
insulators, etc. The impossibility to build from a locally generated 
technology internal and external structures (towers, air conditioning 
ducts, earthing accessories, etc.), cables (open wire, underground cables, 
power cables, open and insulated) and several other engineering tools 
needed in telecommunications installation and maintenance, or essential 
equipments like switching devices, were as many sources of weakness and 
confusion (70). But such requirements did not receive much attention 
during the implementation phase of the Panaftel network. Instead, very 
unrealistic targets-were set for the network during the United Nations 
Communication Decade in Africa (71). 
A major issue of concern in the Panaftel project and the Transport and 
Telecommunications Decade was the improvement, or more exactly the 
creation of a rural network in Africa. A report analyzing the Decade of 
Transportation and communications in Africa has suggested that telephone 
has made a negligible impact on areas with a low population (72). The report 
pointed out the fact that "over 300 million people, or 80 percent of the 
population, live in rural areas, but the network has been concentrated in 
major cities and towns." 
Consequently, one of the main objectives of the African countries is the 
extension of public telecommunications service to the rural areas as well 
as urban centers. The International Telecommunications Union has proposed 
the provision of one public call box for every 10,000 people in the rural 
areas if the telecommunications sector can expand at a rate of 14 percent 
per year for Black African countries. Despite the modesty of such a 
projection, the probability of a significant expansion of African 
telecommunications is low (the projected rate is around 10.4 percent for 
the whole of Africa according to the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa). 
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Before these uncertainties a question remains unanswered: if national 
economies are not improved, how will it be possible to build a Pan-African 
network in the rural areas and where will one find the required funds? If 
these funds are provided by external sources, will the goal of 1 public 
telephone box for 10,000 people significantly improve the 
telecommunications demand in the rural areas, and in this case, will it be 
realistic to expect an expansion of telecommunications demand in the same 
areas? 
One may add that the PANAFTEL project as it is presently known leaves very 
large areas in Northern Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, the Central and 
Southern Sudan, the Central African Basin, Central and Northern Zaire, the 
entire Far Eastern part of the Horn of Africa without any basic terrestrial 
telecommunications facilities. Furthermore, the project ratifies the da 
facto partition of the continent into two areas: the Maghrebin countries 
;plus Egypt, the western Sahara, the Sudan and possibly Libya) more inclined 
toward the ARABSAT project, and the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa where 
the PANAFTEL system operates. 
Finally, one can be assured that if all the hypothetical funds to implement 
the project were ever received, the debt incurred by the African countries 
would not have been repaid beyond the year 2020. The PANAFTEL project 
may seriously aggravate the external debt of Africa and, consequently, 
block the investment capacities of these countries in other vital sectors. 
It is difficult, after having identified the facts commanding PanafteYs 
evolution, to be enthusiastic about the future of the network. Beyond the 
constraints listed above, there are many fundamental questions 
determining the lives of millions of Africans and the future of several 
generations to come which are not addressed by the Panaftel project as it 
is presently conceived. These questions are the following ones: 
* Who will provide the hundreds of million dollars needed to complete the 
project and where will the resources come from? 
It is clear that the already huge external debt of the African countries, 
the blocked character of their economies and, before all, the state of 
extreme material and moral poverty in which evolves the overwhelming 
majority of the African peoples do not plead in favor of an economic 
recovery in a visible future. The African telecommunications authorities 
know it and the African governments are aware better than anybody else of 
the economic abyss into which the continent is plunged. But senseless 
hopes and carelessly conducted telecommunications policies fedby external 
pressures coming both from multinational corporations, financial lending 
centers of the capitalist world and from the dominant spheres of the 
African societies have led to the belief that the widely practised 
neocolonial policies and the outward-oriented looking communications 
networks of the African countries could give birth to a significant 
development of telecommunications systems and national economies. While 
this golden dream is literally falling apart before our eyes, capital hunting 
in the international lending circles is still in practice and is even 
perceived as a panacea by planning authorities more anxious to fulfill a 
mythical vision --the construction at all costs of a Pan-African network 
emptied from any meaningful dimension-- than to courageously weigh the 
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unf avorable terms and certainly the devastating eff ects of a network that 
would not meet the needs of the rural masses. Such a network would not 
indeed be of much utility in improving low illiteracy rates, pressing long 
distance telephone needs and television demand in countries where this 
medium could be of a tremendous help in the educational, political, social 
and cultural spheres. 
The supreme failure for the African rural world would be to finance the 
Panaftel network without the farmers, fishers and herders being able to 
benefit from increased telecommunications services (more PCOs per 
locality, less expensive telephone and telegraph rates, increased level of 
intra-rural telecommunications, fast delivery of meteorological data to 
improve agricultural practices, health delivery units backed by an 
efficient telecommunications system, etc., etc.). The present state of 
impoverishment of the rural masses and the aggravating disparities 
between the rural areas and the cities may not allow the African rural 
world to be in a position to accept the considerable efforts required by 
Panaftel's completion. 
Consequently, the only available source of financing remains the 
traditional channels provided by the World Bank, the European Economic 
Community, private businesses, the multinational corporations and 
countries interested in telecommunications investments in Africa. But as 
we all know, the economic recession prevailing in the capitalist world 
coupled with recent turmoils in international relations will not make 
possible the advent of spectacular investments in the African 
telecommunications market. Then, to know where the money will come from 
to finance the Panaftel project will truly remain a Jigsaw puzzle as long as 
one locks oneself in the false dialectics of the unrestrained recourse to 
foreign "help." 
* In what ways should the Panaftel project contribute to the economic 
development of the region? 
It is difficult from now to speculate on Panafters future impact on the 
African economies in the )MBt century. However, a certitude remains: if 
the network's present conceptual framework is maintained, at the beginning 
of the next century the African telecommunications network would not have 
any function but to link capital cities built a Bresilienne or at the image 
of Abidjan and Nairobi while the rural areas would suffer from isolation and 
extremely poor telecommunications services. 
But more importantly, we would have failed to build a network in conformity 
with the objectives of economic self-reliance because the Pan-African 
telecommunications network would be the extension of the old colonial 
routes confined in the coastal areas and the "useful" agricultural and 
mining areas. Moreover, the Panaftel network would be nothing but a kind 
of a Trojan Horse whose function would be to link the African networks to 
the 'Wired World' or the "Global Village". Such links would assure to world 
capitalism the control of Africa's military space and the accelerated 
pillage of the local raw materials and agricultural products. 
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* What do we need the Panaftel network for? 
Depending on which side of the telecommunications spectrum one is speaking 
from and who takes position on the issue several options are available. 
From the users standpoint the network should speed up the level of 
communications within the rural world. The Senegalese f armers may need to 
know more about the agricultural conditions of the Pongwe people in Gabon 
and vice versa. The Niominka fishermen living in the Salum Islands may be 
anxious to have a better knowledge about the fishing traditions, the level 
of production and the price markets in the Madagascar Islands. The 
Erythrean shoemaker would be surely happy to use the network in order to 
be approvisioned with good quality skins at competitive prices by one of his 
Yoruba colleagues in Nigeria. Instead of walking or at best riding a donkey 
to reach in emergency the closest medical center located several dozen 
miles away the African woman living the Sahelian area would surely 
appreciate being able to quickly reach a doctor either by telephone or 
through aradio link. These down-to-earth preoccupations are those of the 
majority of the potential users living in the rural areas. 
Consequently, the cornerstone of any planning strategy aiming at launching 
the Panaftel project should be the satisfaction of the basic 
telecommunications needs of the African masses. The ultimate objective of 
such a project should be to alleviate the sufferings of all orders 
suffocating the African rural world by increasing the level and speed of 
communications, the level of productive forces and contributing in the 
transformation of the global mode of production. 
In order to reach such goals, the telecommunications planning efforts of 
the next decade should not be concentrated on the rural areas alone. The 
African countries cannot afford to operate a satellite system for the 
rural world alone for all the reasons raised earlier. A hybrid satellite 
system doubled with microwave. high frequency and submarine cable systems 
should certainly be more appropriate to the African conditions. But 
microwave systems should not be implemented in different arteries Just 
because external pressures would have imposed their presence in the 
network- Microwave systems are expensive and they must preferably be 
launched in areas where a high level of traffic density would allow their 
competitive existence. 
* Who will operate the Panaftel system ? 
One of the important externalities that one is rightfully inclined to expect 
from the Panaftel system is the qualitative and quantitative improvement 
of the personnel operating the network. The tragic lack of qualified 
manpower, particularly highly trained engineers, pleads in favor of a more 
aggressive and skillful planning of professional education in 
telecommunications studies. The rare workshops animated by the ITU for 
the training of mid-level engineers cannot solve this delicate problem nor 
can the educational programs intended to give a practical training to 
African students attending the few telecommunications schools existing in 
the continent. It is indeed urgent that the narrow minded approaches 
conf ining technical studies to the management and operation of the existing 
high frequency circuits dominating the network be re-oriented in response 
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to the pressing necessity for re-designing the content and purpose of 
applied research and professional training in the African 
telecommunications schools. 
There is no royal way to reach technological and economic wealth but to be 
off the beaten track and to be committed to knowledge acquisition and 
apprenticeship. Apprenticeship is ultimately linked with the pitfalls of 
learning during probationary times. But errors educate for life. They 
impress on collective memory the indispensable character of technological 
innovation and the imperatives of nation building. The untimely recourse 
to Western "assistance" for repairing the slightest breakdown in national 
networks or manufacturing an electrical wire or a switching system 
castrates peoples' confidence in their intrinsic capacities. The 
perpetuation of this situation makes them vulnerable to foreign invasion 
and control. 
The safest way to avoid technological underdevelopment is to do for 
oneself what others have done for themselves: to learn from one's 
mistakes, to avoid being inhibited by small details or daily preoccupations 
and to pro3ect oneself towards the remotest future. For it is wiser to 
master the future today than to wait until tomorrow when it will be too late 
to understand its complexity. 
5. Prospective Avenues for Telecommunications Liberation in Africa 
The question emerging from the facts discussed here is whether Africa has 
better chances today to win a significant place in nations' march towards 
socio-technical progress. 
The answer is yes if she is able to develop in a single Pan-African 
audacious and yet realistic self-sustainable and self-reliant 
communications systems before the beginning of the next millenium. There 
must be no other way to envision the future, especially when one bears in 
mind the fact that if present economic policies were pursued it would take 
close to one century to the 20 poorer countries of Africa to double their 
present per capita income. 
Africa's involvement in the telecommunications industry is quite marginal. 
Most of the countries are still unable to manufacture simple cables, 
microwave technology, microprocessors, switching devices, satellite 
dishes, fiber optics systems,-etc. In addition, there are severe training 
problems associated with a lack of coordination of policies and prospective 
needs. 
All of this is happening at a time when predictions on communications 
advances are being challenged by the imminent industrialization of the 
outerspace, the operationalization of megaton satellites, fiber optics 
networks carrying at light speed thousands of signals at the same time, 
etc. Man has landed on the moon and is trying now to exploit its mineral 
resources. Mankind is faced with a new need. Advances in astronomy and 
spatial communications have forced us to correctly pose and solve the 
equation of our relationship with the numerous galaxies of a universe in 
full expansion. 
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It is time that by pooling their resources, the African countries create a 
Pan-African Centre for Spatial Studies backed by African university 
resources and know how. Such a centre would have as a main target to make 
possible the mastering of satellite communications technology and 
developing new technologies for optimal utilization of the most needed 
frequency bands. 
In accordance with this objective, the African countries should immediately 
launch actions at the appropriate levels of the International 
Telecommunications Union and the United Nations system in order to get 
space slots in the geostationary orbit and allocations in the frequency 
spectrum resources matching the legitimate spatial ambitions of a 
respected Africa. 
It is not unreasonable to think that with all her tremendous potential in 
natural resources, and with the decisive and radical changes that could be 
generated by a united Africa within an economic federation or a United 
States of Africa, the continent could in a relatively short period, 
successfully develop a truly modern telecommunications system in the 
vanguard of technological achievements. 
Three conditions will determine the success of such goals : 
1) the unification of the continent and its economic integration at the Pan- 
African level; 
2) the achievement of economic and technological self-reliance ; and, 
3) telecommunications strategies primarily based on the total development 
of rural areas through the decentralization of the economic life from the 
present cities to the rural areas. 
These objectives are attainable if we keep faith in the necessity to unite 
Africa. Those submitting that without foreign help Africa cannot be 
developed forget to evaluate the geostrategic and economic weight of this 
continent. One should bear in mind that Africa is three times larger than 
Europe or the United States. It covers 30 million square kilometres and 
accounts for between one-quarter and one-third of the world's land 
surface. In 1980, the population was around 470 million, i.e., one fifth of the 
world population. It should reach 813 million by the year 2000. Despite 
drought, desert creep, threatened plant species, and endemic human and 
animal diseases, the continent is known to possess considerable 
agricultural, mineral, energy, forest, fish and wildlife resources. 
A colonial explorer wrote a century ago that Africa was a "geological 
scandal". Africa's share in the world's mining sector (excluding the Soviet 
Union) is indeed impressive : 99 % of industrial diamonds ; 86 % of palm 
kernels ; 82 X of cobalt ; 81 % of gold ; 72 % of cocoa ; 62 % of chromite ; 49 
% of manganese ; 30 % of phospate rock and copper, etc... (20). Nigeria was 
until recently the world's fifth largest oil exporter. It produces 85 % of 
the world's niobium depositis. Ghana is the world's second largest 
manganese producer. 
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There is some danger in subjectively assuming in the analysis of African 
telecommunications needs the ideological presupposition that Africa is 
naturally poor and that the living conditions of the African masses cannot 
be improved. This view is part and parcel of the colonial and neo-colonial 
strategies developed by the European and North American countries. 
Telecommunications strategies developed without regard to regionally and 
continentally integrated economies and the subsequent growth, in real 
terms, of the African telecommunications market, is doomed to bankruptcy. 
The all too often forgotten demands required from a nation seeking to 
reach a level of technological self-reliance in telecommunications matters 
must be restated here. 
A nation whose communications flow is conditioned by trading patterns with 
a former colonial power is not a free nation. 
A nation seeking to build a technological base through the language of a 
former colonial power is not a free nation. 
A nation unable to manufacture its own communications technologies is not 
a free nation. 
Therefore, the immediate goal of such a nation is to destroy the bundle of 
unfavorable factors making it a dependent nation. 
The conclusions to draw from this overview of African telecommunications 
history are manifold : 
* the economic development of the continent is inconceivable without 
considerable financial investments in the telecommunications sector ; 
* the present model of development based on the pre-eminence of the urban 
centers over rural areas must be completely reversed if an integrated 
Pan-African telecommunications system is ever to be built ; 
* it is unrealistic to expect the emergence of self-centered and balanced 
economic systems from a rural telecommunications sector based on the 
current dichotomies plaguing national economies (capitals vs. secondary 
cities vs. villages, or agricultural vs. import substitution) ; 
* taken individually, none of the African countries can develop their 
telecommunications systems at the required level. Consequently, the only 
way to transcend the present constraints is to build an integrated Pan- 
African telecommunications network with priority given to a balanced and 
vigorous development of rural areas where live the overwhelming majority 
of the proletarianized African masses ; 
* the financial constraints would no longer be a problem if the continent 
itself exploited its natural resources from an Afrocentric perspective ; 
* the required trained manpower to operate and design the 
telecommunications systems could be available if a Pan-African School of 
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Telecommunications, taking into account the sub-regional constraints and 
the situation particular to each area, is created ; 
* the lease of transponder capacities in international commercial 
satellites organizations is a temporary solution and could aggravate in the 
long run Africa's technological dependency ; 
* the only reasonable way to overcome such a technological constraint is 
to envisage the construction of a spacecraft designed, operated and owned 
by Africans. Judicious South-South cooperation coupled with balanced 
North-South technical cooperation and an accelerated trend of scientific 
education can realistically help Africa build its own satellite system 
before the year 2010 ; 
* the use of such a continental satellite system would not, however, solve 
all the problems. The success of the African telecommunications network 
will finally depend on the level of efficiency of the terrestrial network 
coupled with the continent's economic integration and self-reliant 
development. 
The sufficient condition for the existence of an African satellite system 
is the willingness of the African countries to open their 
telecommunications markets to an unprecedented level of foreign capital 
expansion and to place themselves in a position of total dependence vis-a- 
vis external decision centers to operate, maintain and expand the system. 
But the necessary condition for Africa's self-reliance and economic 
development through the utilization of a regional satellite system is 
twofold. First, major parts of the domestic communications satellite in 
question must be manufactured in Africa thus, enabling the Africans to 
build their own satellite system from a science and technology policy 
rooted in the African cultural genius. Second, success in this area depends 
on the fundamental necessity to promote economic self-reliance, political 
liberation and cultural development on the basis of African unity. Such a 
unity would be based on the unity of African peoples and certainly not on 
a social alliance of African and international bourgecisies. 
What should be done to meet according to the best terms the conditions for 
the emergence of a self-reliant telecommunications system in Africa? 
Relying exclusively on foreign help has proven in practice that it can only 
lead to. bankruptcy. It should be excluded from any serious attempt to 
rebuild the African telecommunications systems. 
Another way to negotiate advantageously in the framework of the present 
international telecommunications order, would be: 1) to let one single Pan- 
African organization negotiate all the agreements, the equipment contracts 
and the design of the future RASCOM system; 2) to change the present 
unfavorable technological position of the African countries by promoting 
a South-South cooperation enabling them to exchange telecommunications 
hardware and software; 3) to promote a vigorous effort for the training of 
high level engineers through the creation of a Pan-African school of 
telecommunications dealing with the operational, maintenance, design and 
planning aspects of new communications technologies. 
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The question emerging frog, the facts discussed here is whether A.-.--- has 
better -hances today to win a significant place in rations' march t_2wards 
?OaiO-teCh-niCal progrese. 
The arewer is yes if she is sole tL develop in a single Pan- African 
audaci-ue and yet realistic self-sustainable and self-reliant 
c _ mmt.niaat ions systems before the beginning of the next. mil enium. Where 
must be no other way to en,,,isicn the future, especially when one bears in 
mina the fact that, if present economic policies were pursued it would take 
close' _i one century to the 24 poorer countries of Africa to double their 
present per capita income. 
Africa's involvement in the telecommunications industry is quite marginal. 
Most of the countries are still unable to manufacture simple cables, 
microwave technology, microprocessors, switching devices, satellite 
dishes. fiber optics systems, etc. In addition, there are severe training 
problems associated with a lack of coordination of policies and prospective 
needs. 
All of this is happening at a time when predictions on communications 
advances are being challenged by the imminent industrialization of the 
outerspace, the operationalization of megaton satellites, fiber optics 
networks carrying at light speed thousands of signals at the same time, 
etc. Man has landed on the moon and is trying now to exploit its mineral 
resources. Mankind is faced with a new need. Advances in astronomy and 
spatial communications have forced us to correctly pose and solve the 
equation of our relationship with the numerous galaxies of a universe in 
full expansion. 
It is time that by pooling their resources, the African countries create a 
Pan-African Centre for Spatial Studies backed by African university 
resources and know how. Such a centre would have as a main target to make 
possible the mastering of satellite communic-ations technology and 
1evel-,p,rg2 new technologies f^ri optimal utili--atior. ^f the most needed 
freque::ay bands. 
In accordance with this objective. the African countries should immediately 
Islanch actions; at the appropriate levels of the International Telecommunications Union and the United Nations system in order to get space Blot e in the gecetati=nary -orbit and allocati^ris in the frequen-;' 
spectrum resources matching the legitimate spa'.ial amp: ticns cf a 
respected Africa. 
It is not. Jnreasonable to think that with all her tremendous potential in 
natural resources, and with the decisive and radical changes that could be 
generated by a united Africa within an economic federation or a United 
States of Africa. the continent could in a relatively short period, 
successfully develop a truly modern telecommunications system in the 
vanguard of technological achievements. 
Three conditions will determine the success of such goals : 
1) the unification of the continent and its economic integration at the Pan- 
African level: 
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2) the achievement c'f eCC'nc-mic and techriol^giC81 self-reliance , and.. 
3) teleccmmur. c.arione strategies primarily taeed _n the 
t rough the decentralizaticn cf the lif= from the 
tG the areas. 
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